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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KELLY ARLIN BLACK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MCDONALD'S OF LAYTON, and/or 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Case No. 860296 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The central issue presented on appeal is whether the plain-
tiff, and incidentally his three fellow employees, were, contrary 
to the ALJfs ruling, in the course and scope of their employment 
with McDonald's of Layton when they were driving to a softball 
game against McDonald's of North Ogden and were struck and injured 
by another vehicle while traveling to that game. The incidental 
issues inherent in the major issue are two in number, namely: 
1. Are the facts of the present case distinguishable from 
the facts decided by the Supreme Court in Auerbach Company v. 
Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 347, 195 P.2d 245 (1948), thereby 
warranting a different result, or 
2. Should the Auerbach case, decided 38 years ago, be 
overruled because it no longer stands for the appropriate rule of 
law. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 13, 1985, Mr. Black was injured in an automobile 
accident when the car he was driving was hit by a truck. The 
accident occurred at the intersection of 4th Street and Wall 
Avenue, Ogden, Utah (T43). On the day in question, Mr. Black was 
employed by McDonald's of Layton as a crew trainer (T19). With 
Mr. Black at the time of the accident were four other McDonald's 
of Layton employees who were also going to play in the softball 
game between McDonald!s of Layton and McDonald's of North Ogden. 
The game was to be played at McDonald's of North Ogdenfs home 
softball park located at 4th Street and Wall Avenue in Ogden 
(T44). The fellow employees of Mr. Black who were riding with him 
to the McDonald's game were Robert VanDyke, Vicki Thome, Richard 
Hatch and Sherrie Debbrecht (T39). All of the occupants of the 
vehicle were injured, including Mr. Black, and Vicki Thorne and 
Sherrie Debbrecht were very seriously injured, with Miss Debbrecht 
suffering a severely shattered pelvis, bladder and spleen injury, 
left eye injury, and some muscle paralysis (T91) , and Miss Thome 
suffered a fractured pelvis, a ruptured bladder, and a fractured 
back, some cuts resulting in scars on her arm and face, and loss 
of memory of events preceding the accident (T369). 
The softball league the employees were engaged in at the 
time of the accident was organized by the various McDonald's 
Restaurants in the Weber, Davis, Salt Lake, Tooele, and Utah 
County areas. There was a set of "McDonald's of Utah Softball 
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Rulesn prepared and distributed to the various teams, (T283) and 
Rule 1 and 14 required a certain number of female employees to be 
on each team at each game, and mandated that all players "must" be 
employed at that McDonald's for whom he or she plays or the game 
would be forfeited (T250, 258, 283). 
John Parisi, the operations consultant for McDonald's, who 
is the person within the McDonald's organization who organized the 
softball league in the first instance, testified that it was the 
policy of McDonald's to allow and encourage its employees to have 
activities, even though the activities may not be organized by 
corporate people within McDonald's. McDonald's does, however, 
publish and distribute to its employees a crew employee handout 
which states the policy that McDonald's employees will be given 
the opportunity to participate in activities like baseball, volley-
ball, and bowling, and that those extra curricular activities 
should be encouraged so that employees can have fun and to provide 
them an opportunity to have a good time and get to know the fellow 
employees better. It encourages employees who are interested in 
such activities to contact their management team (T236-239). He 
also testified that it is his opinion that the softball league, in 
which the injured occupants of the Black car were participating in, 
instills fun and competitive type pride outside the McDonald's 
store, and that such incentive geared activity makes the employee 
feel a part of a team inside the McDonald's organization 
(T266-268). 
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The McDonald!s League softball games were played from June 
to August under a schedule which called for games each Tuesday and 
Thursday morning (T22, 108, and 302). At the beginning of the 
season, each participating store contributed either $25.00 or 
$35.00 to the McDonald's League for the purchase of score books, 
softballs, and trophies. The fee as to McDonald!s of Layton was 
paid by the employer, and not the employees (T119 and 294). Tro-
phies were given to the winning teams of each division and the 
runner up team. The money remaining after the purchase of score 
books, softballs, and trophies was scheduled to be divided 75% to 
the championship team and 25% to the runner up team. That money 
would be paid to the employer, and not the individual employee 
players (T33) . 
McDonald's of Layton employees and prospective employees 
were informed of the softball league, and the participation of 
that storefs team in the league during pre-employment interviews, 
where Mr. Black was asked if he played softball, and when he 
responded that he did, was told that was good because the store 
needed softball players to come out and play on the store team 
(T75-76). The store manager also told new employees about the 
games, and encouraged their participation in the softball program 
during the new employee orientation meeting (T153-154) , and they 
further notified the employees and encouraged their participation 
by posting a schedule and a sign up sheet on the employee bulletin 
board, (T25, 31, 83, 116, 306, 353, and 393). 
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Employees who were playing on the company softball team 
where scheduled at work for times other than the time set for the 
softball game (T29). The employer purchased shirts or jerseys 
with numbers for the members of th softball team (T32-33). The 
employer furnished the score book and the softballs for home 
games, and the employees furnished their own mits, and bats (T31, 
and 310) . The employees were not payed by their employer during 
the time they were playing the games (T26, and 289). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The applicant, and his co-employees, were engaged in an 
employer-sponsored social affair, which under the Workman's 
Compensation Statute is sufficient to bring them under the coverage 
of the Act. 
ARGUMENT 
Most of the Courts throughout the United States, in the 
past several years, have moved toward the recognition that an 
employer-sponsored social affair which promotes the employer's 
purpose is sufficient work related activity to bring a person 
within the coverage of the Workman's Compensation Act when they 
are injured while engaged in such an employer-sponsored social 
affair, or traveling to or from such an affair. While this Court 
has not ruled on a case directly in point, it appears to have been 
following the trend holding that participation in employer-spon-
sored social affairs brings a person within the coverage of the 
Workman's Compensation Act. 
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While it is true that 38 years ago in the case of Auerbach 
Company v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 347, 195 P.2d 245 
(1948), this Court found, under the peculiar fact situation of 
that case, that Miss Wardle, who was playing on the Utah Shamrock1s 
Basketball Team that received some support from the Auerbach store, 
but not all of its support, nor were all of its team members 
employees of Auerbach, that while traveling from a basketball game 
with a non-team member, and being involved in an automobile acci-
dent in so doing, that the provisions of Title 42-1-1 et seq of 
the 1943 Utah Code did not apply. In the intervening 38 years, 
the concept of Workman's Compensation Law has substantially 
changed, and other Utah cases have seemed to retreat from some of 
the rationale of that decision. 
In Stroud v. Industrial Commission, 2 Utah 2d 270, 272 P.2d 
187 (1954) an off duty police officer on his day off, arranged 
with two other police officers to check out to them, in his capa-
city as a police officer, a special police car. While transferring 
cases of beverage to an automobile for transportation to the 
Police Benefit party, his firearm discharged killing him. This 
Court held that the accident both "arose out of" and "was in the 
course of!! his employment even though he was off duty, and was not 
directly engaged in the activity for which he was hired as a police 
officer for Salt Lake City. 
This Court more recently, in Martinson v. W-M Insurance 
Agency, Inc., (Utah) 606 P.2d 256 (1980), dealt with a situation 
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where Mr. Martinson was returning to Salt Lake City from Park 
City, where he had allegedly talked about increasing some insurance 
limits on one of his insurance clients. It appeared, however, 
that his primary purpose in going to Park City was to socialize 
with the director of the Kimball Art Center, and he was returning 
to Salt Lake City about 24 hours after he allegedly transacted his 
business. He also had a blood alcohol content of .18 at the time 
of the accident, which seemed to have some influence on the Court's 
decision as to whether he had been about his business. In any 
event, this Court, in that case, set out some criteria with which 
to evaluate whether one is in the course of his employment or not. 
In doing so, this Court stated: 
n
***Qne of the tests sometimes applied is whether such a 
trip is one which someone else would have had to make 
for the employer at some time if the claimant had not. 
Another such test, which is sometimes helpful is whether 
the paramount or predominant motivation and purpose of 
the trip or other activity is to serve the employer's 
interest, and the social aspect, or other diversion for 
one's own interest, is merely adjunctive thereto. In 
that instance, the person should be deemed to be in the 
course of his employment. 
nConversely, if the predominant motivation and purpose 
of the activity is in serving the social aspect, or 
other personal diversion of the employee, even though 
there may be some transaction of business or performance 
of duty merely incidental to and adjunctive thereto, the 
person should not be deemed to be in the course of his 
employment; and where there is uncertainty as to the 
just-stated proposition, that should be resolved by the 
commission as the trier of the facts.M 
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In the past several years, there seems to have developed a 
trend throughout the country to treat a person engaged in a 
company-sponsored recreational activity, or who is attending a 
company-sponsored social, to be in the course and scope of their 
employment when injured. The general statement of the rule is 
found in 82 Am Jur 2d pp. 66-68, under Sections 283 and 284, 
entitled Recreation or Amusement, and Employer-Sponsored Social 
Affairs; Parties, Picnics, Outings, Etc. Those two Sections state 
as follows, to wit: 
"Section 283. Recreational activity, in the absence of 
a statute expressly excluding it, may be so bound up 
with employment as to create risks incidental thereto so 
that a resulting injury will be deemed compensable. 
According to many authorities, injuries sustained by an 
employee while attending or participating in recreational 
activities of employees may be regarded as arising out 
of and in the course of the employment, so as to be 
compensable, where such activities are promoted, spon-
sored, or encouraged by the employer. The rule of com-
pensability has been applied particularly where the 
injury occurred on the premises of the employer, or 
during an intermission or temporary suspension of work, 
or where the employee!s attendance or participation in 
the activity in question was in pursuance of the orders, 
rules, or requirements of the employer. 
"Many particular cases, however, have held that such 
activities did not have a sufficient relationship to the 
employment to bring the injury within the coverage of 
the statute. An employee on a business trip who engages 
in personal recreation beyond that necessary to the 
normal ministration to the needs of an employee on a 
business trip is not covered by Workman's Compensation 
for injury or death resulting from such recreation. 
"The general rule is said to be that an employee while 
on vacation is not within the protection of the 
Workman's Compensation Law." 
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And in, 
"Section 284, It is generally recognized that under 
appropriate circumstances an injury or death sustained 
by an employee while attending or traveling to or from 
an employer-sponsored social affair may arise out of and 
in the course of employment, so as to be compensable 
under the Workmanfs Compensation Statute. Primary ele-
ments to be considered in determining the compensability 
of an injury received by an employee while attending or 
traveling to or from an employer-sponsored social affair 
are whether the employee was compelled, either directly 
or indirectly, to attend the affair, whether the employer 
derived some benefit from his sponsorship of the func-
tion, the extent to which the employer-sponsored, con-
trolled, or participated in the activity, and whether 
the social affair was a benefit or consideration of the 
employer to which the employee was entitled. The Courts 
have implied these elements to cases involving injuries 
sustained by employees while attending or participating 
in a variety of employer-sponsored social activities, 
including picnics and outings, parties, dances, and the 
like, trips and excursions, and activities of a combined 
business and social nature, the determination of whether 
the injury arose out of and in the course of employment 
making it compensable depending upon the particular 
facts and circumstances of each case. In those instances 
where the injury occurred while the employee was travel-
ing to or from such an employer-sponsored social func-
tion, the compensability of the injury, has also been 
decided on the basis of the extent to which the particu-
lar social affair was employment-related.11 
Many Courts have recognized that employers can put substan-
tial indirect pressure on employees requiring them to attend or 
participate in employer-sponsored social activities. In the 
instant case, we have the employer in both a pre-employment inter-
view and in the employee orientation interview making strong 
overatures that participation in the softball program would be 
looked upon favorably. Such indirect and compelling pressure 
exerted by the employer upon employees to attend the employer-spon-
sored social affair was expressly discussed in the following cases 
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as a factor pointing to the compensability of an injury sustained 
by the emplo3^ ee while attending such function. See Lawrence v. 
Industrial Commission of Arizona, (1955) 78 Ariz. 401, 281 P.2d 
113, where the Court holding that an employee1s injury sustained 
while returning from an employer-sponsored function arose out of 
and in the course of his employment, rejecting the argument that 
the technique of employer direction defines the course of employ-
ment. The degree of pressure which the employer must be shown to 
have exerted in order to define that he directed an employee in a 
given action must not be a requirement which ignores the realities 
of business, the Court said. The superior position of the employer 
permits compulsion to be exerted indirectly, the Court observed 
that it would be unrealistic to fail to recognize that the forces 
of a suggestion or encouragement may equal that of an expressed 
order. See also Stakonis v. United Advertising Company, (1930) 
110 Conn. 384, 148 A 334; Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery v. 
Industrial Commission, (1967) 36 111. 2d 410 223 NE 2d 150; 
Dependents of Staten v. Ewing Gas Company, (1971) (Miss.) 243 So. 
2d 561; Kelly v. Hackensack Water Company, (1950) 10 NJ Super 528, 
77 A 2d 463; and Clevenger v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 
(1965, Tex. Civ. App.) 396 SW 2d 174. 
Civil Courts which have dealt with the question of whether 
or not an injury sustained by an employee while attending an 
employer-sponsored social affair arose out and in the course of 
the employment, within the terms of a Workman's Compensation 
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Statute, have recognized that the determination of compensability 
of such an injury may be affected by the presence or absence of 
benefits derived by the employer from the social function. In 
several cases, the benefits accruing to the employer as a result 
of the employer-sponsored social affair were expressly discussed 
as a factor pointing to the compensability of an injury sustained 
by an employee while attending the affair. The New York Court of 
Appeals in Hill v. McFarland-Johnson, Engineers (1966) 25 App. 
Div. 2d 899, 269 NYS 2d 217, held that an injury suffered by an 
employee in an automobile accident which occurred when he was 
returning from the outing arose out of and in the course of employ-
ment, concluding that the picnic had for its purpose the improve-
ment of employee relations and a building of morale^ for which the 
employer reasonably might expect to derive some tangible benefit. 
That case was very similar to the present case in that Mr. Parisi, 
McDonald's corporate representative, testified that the primary 
purpose of the establishment of the softball league was to build 
the morale of the employees and help them work better within the 
company by participating in social activities through the softball 
league organized by McDonald's. To the same effect are a number 
of cases, namely, Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery v. 
Industrial Commission, Supra; Noble v. Zimmerman, 237 Ind. 556, 
146 NE 2d 828; Linderman v. Cowni Furs, 234 Iowa 708, 13 NW 2d 
677; Kelly v. Hackensack Water Company, Supra; Riccirdi v. Damar 
Products Company, 45 NJ 55, 211 A 2d 347; Gore v. New York Air 
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Brake Company, 33 App. Div. 2d 851, 305 NYS 2d 814; and Kohlmayer 
v, Keller, 24 Ohio St 2d 10, 263 NE 2d 231. 
In several of the foregoing cases, the Courts have also 
recognized that some degree of employer-sponsorship and control of 
the social affair is a factor pointing to the compensability of an 
injury sustained by an employee in connection with the affair. 
The employer's sponsorship, arrangement for a facility, furnishing 
of supplies, and the like is looked at as a factor in determining 
whether injury while associated with the activity is compensable. 
The cases have uniformly held that if the social function 
is employer-sponsored, and an injury at it would be compensable, 
an injury while traveling to or from it would be equally compens-
able. See all the foregoing cited cases. 
Where we have the McDonald's parent organization sponsoring 
a Wasatch Front Softball League to which McDonald's of Layton sent 
an employee, appointed him as coach, furnished jerseys for parti-
cipation of the team in the sport, required that only McDonald 
employees could participate in the sport, and routinely scheduled 
their employees, who were participating, work schedule around the 
softball game schedules, it appears quite clear that there was 
sufficient direction, control, and not too subtle encouragement of 
employees to participate in the softball program, which had as its 
primary purpose the building of morale outside the work place so 
as to increase the morale inside the work place. Under those 
circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that the participation 
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in the softball program, with the accident occurring as the team 
members, all employees of McDonald's were attempting to find their 
way into the softball park where the game was to be played, is 
work related, and should be compensable under Utah Workman's 
Compensation Law. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by 
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge and sustained by the 
Industrial Commission as a whole by their entry of a denial of 
motion for review should be reversed, and the Industrial 
Commission should be ordered to find that Mr. Black sustained a 
compensable industrial accident on June 13, 1985, while in the 
course and scope of his employment with the defendant McDonald's 
of Layton. 
Respectfully submitted, 
--WENDELL E. BENNETT 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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332, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Industrial Commission of I h, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 4,, 
1986, at 8:30 o'clock a.m. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The Applicant was represented by Wendell Bennett, 
Attorney at Law. 
The Defendants were represented by James R. Black and 
Laurie Haynie, Attorney's at Law. 
At the time and place set for the evidentiary hearing, counsel for 
the parties notified the Administrative Law Judge that there would be no need 
for an evidentiary hearing, since the issues involved were legal, and the 
parties had heretofore deposed all of the necessary witnesses. Therefore, 
instead of a hearing, oral argument was had from counsel on the Motion to 
Dismiss filed by the Defendants. Having had the opportunity to hear the 
argument, and having reviewed the depositions of the witnesses, and being 
fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is prepared to 
enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The Applicant herein, Kelly Arlin Black, was employed by McDonald's 
of Lay ton as a crew trainer, which is not a management position. 
KELLY ARLIN BLACK 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
On June 13, 1985, the Applicant and four co-employees were on their way to a 
Softball game at North Ogden Park, when the Applicant's car was struck on the 
driver's side by a truck, resulting in injuries to the Applicant and rather 
severe injuries to some of the car's occupants. The Applicant missed 
approximately 3 days of work as a result of the injury, and sustained some 
lacerations on his arm and elbow. Following his accident, the Applicant filed 
a claim for compensation alleging that at the time of his injury, he was in 
the course or scope of his employment with the Defendant, McDonald's of 
Layton. Thereafter, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the claim on the 
grounds that the Applicant was not in the course or scope of his employment at 
the time of his injury. 
The employer in urging the Dismissal relies on Auerbach Company v. 
Industrial Commission, 195 P.2nd 245 (Utah 1945), wherein the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the granting of benefits by the Commission to an employee of 
Auerbach's, who was injured in an automobile accident while on her way to play 
basketball for the Auerbach's Shamrocks. In that case, the team was part of 
the company's public relations and advertising campaign, and the Applicant had 
her expenses paid by her enqployer when she travelled with the team. She was 
not hired to play basketball or required to play basketball, nor was she paid 
to play basketball, rather she was only paid for her work as a cashier. The 
court in denying compensability indicated that "The issue is limited to a 
question of whether or not, as part of her employment as cashier, she was 
under the duty of playing basketball. We think not." Auerbachs at page 246. 
The court went on to indicate that one of the most important factors in its 
decision was that the employer did not have the right to require the Applicant 
to play basketball, nor did they have a right of control. 
The Defendants also rely on the treatise of Professor Arthur Larson, 
Section 22.00 et seq. for further support of their Motion to Dismiss. 
Professor Larsen has indicated that there are four types of tests from the 
various jurisdictions that seem to govern the compensability of injuries 
sustained while engaged with company teams: 
1. Whether the games take place on or off the premises 
and in or out of working hours, 
2. Employer initiative, 
3. Employer contribution of money or equipment, and 
4. Quantities and types of employer benefit. Larson, 
Workman's Compensation Law. Section 22-24 (A), page 
5-139. 
KELLY ARLIN BLACK 
ORDER 
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Larson goes on to indicate that: 
[1] If the games are played both off the premises and 
after hours, the burden of proving work-connection falls 
heavily on the factors of employer initiative, financing, 
and benefit, and a showing of these points which might have 
sufficed in a case with some time or place work-connection 
may well prove to be inadequate. Id. 
Before determining the legal issue, it is necessary to develop the 
facts further. The Softball team which the Applicant was playing on had its 
origins in 1983, when some McDonald's employees of some of the McDonald 
corporate stores, as compared to owner-operated stores, inquired about the 
possibility of playing softball. The inquiry had been directed to a Mr. 
Parisi, who was an operations consultant for the corporate McDonald's 
outlets. Mr. Parisi had worked for McDonald's in California starting in 1969 
and had played on various softball teams until he came to Salt Lake City in 
1981, so he was familiar with how they were organized. Since he had been 
approached towards the end of the summer of 1983, he sent out a memo to the 
McDonald's stores on his own, for the purpose of seeing if there was any 
interest in a tournament. There was sufficient interest in the tournament, so 
the teams played in that format. Mr. Parisi testified that the Defendant, 
McDonald's, did not encourage him to set up the tournament, but rather it was 
done at his initiative after he had been approached by some of his employees. 
In 1984, Mr Parisi was again approached about softball, and so he 
caused another memo to be circulated to the stores. The memo requested that 
the management people not be involved, since it was his intent that it be for 
the enjoyment of the employees only, and he did not want the employees to feel 
intimidated by having management personnel in positions of authority within 
the team structure. Mr. Parisi testified that the McDonald's Corporation is 
always looking for employee activities, but that the employees must organize 
the same. Mr. Parisi further testified that he was not encouraged by anyone 
at McDonald's to organize the league, but rather did so at the request of the 
employees. 
In 1985, he sent out another memo, which again requested stores 
between Provo and Ogden to sign up if they were interested in participating in 
the softball league. The evidence indicates that not all of the stores 
participated. The memo also requested that those interested bring a $25.00 or 
$35.00 registration fee, which would be used for the purpose of purchasing 
scorebooks, softballs, and trophies for the end of the season. With respect 
to the Layton store, the memo from Mr. Parisi was received, and the manager of 
the store, having previously been approached by several employees concerning 
the possibility of whether there would be softball in 1985, determined that 
the employees would probably want to participate again. 
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Accordingly, Mr. Cunning, the manager, inquired of Lawrence Shelton, 
a crew member, if he would be interested in coaching the team, since he had 
coached the Roy team the year before. Mr. Shelton agreed to take on the task, 
and testified that he felt no pressure to coach the team, but rather he wanted 
to do so. Mr. Shelton then arranged to post a sign-up sheet on the employee 
bulletin board, for those that might be interested. The employees then signed 
up, and Mr. Shelton then contacted them later concerning when the first game 
would be. 
The owner of the store purchased some jerseys or T-shirts, which were 
plain and did not contain any McDonald's logos whatsoever. The coach 
testified that the intent was that the T-shirts would be returned at the end 
of the season. The coach testified that the store did not provide any 
equipment, other than the 3 softballs which were purchased with the 
registration fee. The bats belonged to the coach, and each team member 
furnished his/her own glove. The games were played during off hours, in other 
words, no one was compensated for playing softball. If a game conflicted with 
a team member's regularly scheduled shift, then it was the responsibility of 
that individual to either arrange for someone to cover, or else they could not 
participate in that particular game. All of the witnesses, incuding the 
Applicant, testified that they received no special treatment with respect to 
scheduling, although it would appear from the record, that the person in 
charge of scheduling did attempt to schedule around the softball games, 
especially if requested by one of the team members. The coach testified that 
the Applicant and those team members in his car were night shift people, and 
as such, they did not have that scheduling problem. The coach further 
testified that they were not provided with any free food or drinks, or any 
other form of payment for their participation, nor did they receive any 
transportation expenses or any other expenses for their participation in the 
softball league. This league consisted wholly of McDonald's employees, and 
each team was required to have a minimum of 3 female members on the field at 
all times. The rules were ratified by the team coaches, and were enforced by 
the league commissioners, who were elected by the team coaches. 
Applying the legal tests of Larson to the instant facts of this case, 
I find that the games did not occur on the employer's premises during a lunch 
or recreation period as a regular incident of the employment, but rather were 
played off the premises at a Clearfield City park during off hours. 
Therefore, as Larsen has indicated, ". . . The burden of proving 
work-connection falls heavily on the factors of employer initiative,, financing 
and benefit,. . . ". From the evidence on the file, the Administrative Law 
Judge concludes that the preponderance of evidence clearly supports a finding 
that the softball league was initiated by the employees, and not McDonald's. 
Although Mr. Parisi did take it upon himself to organize the league, the 
Administrative Law Judge is satisfied that he did so of his own volition, and 
not at the behest or direction of McDonald's. 
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In making this finding, I am mindful that the employee handbook 
encourages the participation by employees in recreational and social 
activities, and that the McDonald's of Layton store had an Activities 
Chairman. However, this Activities Chairman was compensated by McDonald's for 
any planning time or other activity that she had to engage in on behalf of the 
social committee. The Softball league was not a part of that activities 
program, but rather their activities consisted mostly of organizing employee 
get-togethers, Christmas parties, summer parties, and the like. The 
Activities Committee was also in charge of the employee incentive programs, 
such as the McBuck program for the fastest drive-thru team, the fastest 
counter help, etc. 
The third test involves the amount of financial support furnished by 
an employer to a company team. Larson has indicated that the contribution of 
a $1,000 to the team by the employer for the purchase of equipment, which 
equipment was stored on the premises, was still not sufficient to award 
compensation to the Applicant. In this case, the $35.00 registration fee was, 
negligible, and the employees' expenses for transportation, were not covered 
by the company. Further, £he employees were required to furnish their own 
equipment, and did so. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge cannot find 
that the contribution of the employer in the form of the T-shirts and the 
registration fee was sufficient to satisfy that test. Larson concluded that 
"Although facts of this kind are helpful in building a cummulative case of 
employer involvement, standing alone they are ordinarily not enough to meet 
the burden of proof." Larson Secton 22.24 (d). Finally, Larson requires that 
there must be some employer benefit- from the team so as to confer 
compensability on the claim. In this respect, he writes: 
Controversy is encountered also when the 
benefit asserted is the intangible value of 
increased worker efficiency and morale. 
Basically the problem with this argument is 
not that such benefits do not result, but 
they result from every game the employee 
plays whether connected with his work or 
not. * * * It can be taken as the majority 
view that these morale and efficiency 
benefits are not alone enough to bring 
recreation within the course of employment. 
Mr. Parisi testified that McDonald's encourages employee activities 
because, as indicated in the crew member manual (corporate): "This type of 
extracurricular activities is fun and provides you with an opportunity to have 
a good time and get to know your fellow-employees better." Mr. Cunning, the 
store manager, also testified that the purpose of the various activities is to 
keep the job fun and improve employee performance. 
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The jerseys did not contain the McDonald's logo, and the team was not 
part of any McDonald's publicity or advertising campaign. Further, the team 
results were not written up in any store newspaper or town newspaper. 
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that the only benefit 
derived by the employer was that of improving morale and efficiency. 
Therefore, the Applicant has not satisfied the requirements enunciated by 
Professor Larson for compensability in this area. 
The Applicant, by and through counsel, has contended that the 
employer placed substantial indirect pressure on his employees to play 
Softball. As support for this contention, he indicates that the employer in 
both a pre-employment interview and in the employment orientation interview 
made strong overtures that participation in the softball games would be looked 
upon favorably. The Administrative Law Judge has reviewed the depositions of 
the witnesses, and I conclude that that pressure while alleged, has not been 
proven. Rather, it would seem to the Administrative Law Judge that the 
employees were advised of the activities available to them, and it was left up 
to them whether or not they wanted to participate in the Softball program. 
All of the witnesses, including the Applicant, testified clearly that the 
softball program was voluntary, and that there was no impression or feeling on 
their part that their participation was required to keep their jobs. In fact, 
Sherri Debbrecht, had not planned on playing any softball at all in the summer 
of 1985, but she played because her co-employees asked her to. The same can 
be said for Vicky Home, who testified that she also had not planned on 
playing softball in 1985, but had indicated to the Applicant, who was a very 
good friend of hers, that in the event-they were unable to get the 3 women 
necessary to avoid forfeiture, then she would play in that circumstance. With 
respect to the game to be played on June 13, 1985, she was approached by the 
Applicant, and asked if she would play. Since they were friends, and since 
she did not want the team to forfeit the game, she agreed to participate on 
June 13, 1985. The evidence in this respect, does not support the allegation 
that it was the employer who pressured either of these women into 
participating. Rather, they participated because they had been asked to do so 
by their fellowemployees. The store manager attended approximately 4 games, 
if he was not scheduled to work, but did not attend otherwise. It would seem 
to the Administrative Law Judge that if the employer was truly exerting 
pressure in this regard, then he would have taken attendance, which was not 
taken, and he would have attended each game to ensure maximum participation, 
however, this did not occur. 
The Applicant has also opined that the decisions in Stroud v. 
Industrial Commission, 272 P.2d, and Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency. 606 
P.2d, are indicative of the Utah Supreme Court's support of a "work related" 
test of course of employment, which does not require that the Applicant be on 
the premises to recover, or that he be on the time clock to recover 
compensation. 
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However, it would seem to the Administrative Law Judge that the Stroud case is 
distinguishable, in that the Applicant therein had been directed to the police 
station for the purpose of checking out a police car to two other officers. 
The men were delayed, so the Applicant started transferring beverages to his 
automobile while waiting for their arrival. As he was doing so, his gun fell 
from his holster and discharged, killing the Applicant. Since the Applicant 
had been directed to the police station by his employer, he was clearly on a 
special errand for the employer at the time of his death, and as such, was 
entitled to recover Workers' Compensation benefits. The Applicant herein, was 
not directed by his employer to play softball, rather, the Applicant 
volunteered for that activity himself. 
The Applicant's reliance on the Martinson case is also questionable, 
since Martinson requires that whether the person is in the course or scope of 
their employment depends on "whether such a trip is one which someone else 
would have had to make for the employer at some time if the claimant had not." 
606 P.2d at 258. It cannot be said that the employer would have sent another 
employee in place of the Applicant, had the Applicant not been able to 
attend. Rather, the coach took it upon himself to call the players the night 
before each game to inquire as to whether or not they would be attending. If 
he was informed that an employee would not be able to attend, then he would 
attempt to find some other employee to attend, however management of the store 
did not recruit replacements or substitutes. 
Martinson also asks "whether the paramount or predominant motivation 
and purpose of the trip or other activity is to serve the employer's interest, 
and the social aspects, or other diversion for one's own interest, is merely 
adjunctive thereto". Id. While it is true that the Defendant, McDonald's of 
Layton, may have derived some indirect benefit from the improved employee 
morale resulting from the softball games, this is not equivalent to a finding 
that the predominant purpose of those games was to serve the employer's 
interest. Rather, the predominant motivation and purpose of softball games 
was to serve the social aspect or entertainment diversion of the employees. 
The remainder of the cases cited by the Applicant are inapplicable to 
the case at bar. 
The Administrative Law Judge finds and concludes that the Applicant 
and the other occupants of his car did not sustain a compensable industrial 
accident during the course or scope of their employment with the Defendant, 
McDonald's of Layton. Rather, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the 
activity of the employees was initiated by the employees without the indirect 
or direct pressure of the employer to participate, and that the employer other 
than the benefit of improved employee morale and performance, derived no 
significant, substantial benefit from the softball league. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Kelly Arlin Black did not sustain a compensable industrial accident 
on June 13, 1985, while in the course or scope of his employinent with the 
Defendant, McDonaldfs of Layton. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and,unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to r^ vi-ew- op^ajppea^:
 7 
//fsis^/'f' ' X. ' //f r/v/1,^ 
Timothy C. Allen 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah this 
/ ^ ^ day of April, 1986. 
Linda 
Commi 
5trasburg 
fion Secretary 
WENDELL E. BENNETT 
Attorney for Applicant 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7846 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No- 85000922 
oooOooo 
KELLY ARLIN BLACK, fc-(3-fo : MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Applicant, 
vs. 
MCDONALD'S OF LAYTON and/or 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the Applicant above named, Kelly Arlin Black, 
by and through his attorney of record, and asks the Industrial 
Commission of Utah to review the opinion of Timothy C. Allen, 
Administrative Law Judge, which bears the date of April 17, 
1986. 
The Motion for Review is based upon an error of law 
contained in the Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order 
which held that the injuries sustained by Kelly Arlin Black 
are not compensable industrial injuries in that the accident 
of June 13, 1985 were not injuries sustained in the course or 
scope of his employment with the defendant McDonald's of 
Layton. 
Said legal conclusions on the part of the Administrative 
Law Judge are in error, and for the reasons stated by the 
-2-
Applicant in the Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendanc!s 
Motion to Dismiss are not well founded in law-
WHEREFORE, the Applicant prays that the Industrial 
Commission review the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order of Administrative Law Judge Allen, and find that the 
Applicant Kelly Arlin Black was in the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of the accident on June 13, 1985, and 
that his injuries are, therefore, compensable. 
DATED this 3% ^day of April, 1986. 
/J*~MJU Z. V 
WENDELL E. BENNETT 
Attorney for Applicant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the 
foregoing to James R. Black and Laurie Haynie, attorneys for 
Defendants, 261 East 300 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84111, on this g*T day of April, 1986. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85000922 
KELLY ARLIN BLACK, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
MCDONALD'S OF LAYTON and/or 
STATE INSURANCE FUND 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
DENIAL OF 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
On or about April 17, 1986, an Order was entered by an Administrative 
Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were denied in the above entitled 
case. 
On or about April 29, 1986, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Applicant by and through his attorney. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge of April 17, 1986, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the 
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
/O day of May, 1986. 
ATTES^7 . 
... J**£Mt?O0fc 
Linda J . StpTs)>arg 
Commission/Secretary 
^lk4Uk. 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
Walter T. Axelgard«7 
Commissioner 
Lenic>9k L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
